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ABSTRACT
Flooding attacks detection in traffic of backbone networks
requires generally the analysis of a huge amount of data with
high accuracy and low complexity. In this paper, we propose
a new scheme to detect flooding attacks in high speed net-
works. The proposed mechanism is based on the application
of Power Divergence measures over Sketch data structure.
Sketch is used for random aggregation of traffic, and Power
Divergence is applied to detect deviations between current
and established probability distributions of network traffic.
We focus on tuning the parameter of Power Divergence to
optimize the performance. We evaluate our approach us-
ing real Internet traffic traces, obtained from MAWI trans-
Pacific wide transit link between USA and Japan. Our re-
sults show that the proposed approach outperforms existing
solutions in terms of detection accuracy and false alarm ra-
tio.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Network Operation]: Network Monitoring
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Experimentation, Measurement, Per-
formance, Security
Keywords
Network Anomaly Detection, DDoS, Power Divergence, Hel-
linger Distance, Sketch
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1. INTRODUCTION
Security threats for computer network have increased sig-
nificantly, which include viruses, exploitation of software
vulnerabilities, worm-based attacks, Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS), etc. DDoS through TCP SYN flooding is
able to make silent any web site, especially with the use of
BOTNETs (roBOT NETworks) containing large number of
slave machines (zombies).
Many web sites suffered from SYN flooding attack that
aims to exhaust server resources and to deny access for le-
gitimate users. Recently, PayPal has been driven oﬄine af-
ter dropping WiKiLeaks donations (operation PayBack in
2010). The list of victim web servers is very long (Twitter,
CNN, Yahoo, Amazon, Ebay, DoubleClick, etc.). Therefore,
flooding attacks need to be detected in order to cope with
ongoing anomaly as soon as possible.
With the distributed nature of DDoS attacks, and its im-
pact on the performance of the routers, the detection and
reaction mechanisms must be pushed to the core network
(Backbone), or near the sources of attack. However, with
the growing complexity in analyzing huge amount of data
traffic in backbone network, the analysis of each traffic flows
is unscalable and computationally expensive.
Many change point detection algorithms have been pro-
posed, and applied to the time series resulted from the aggre-
gation of whole network traffic in one flow. These methods
are based on the identification of the change point where
heavy deviation occurs in the resulted time series. However,
as these methods aggregate the whole traffic in one time se-
ries, low intensity attacks is buried by the variation of back-
ground traffic in high speed networks, and may pass unde-
tected. Moreover, the time series derived from IP traffic are
subject to many variations that are irrelevant to anomaly.
The time series are non-stationary and tend to change over
time, leading to a lot of false alarms. Reducing the false
alarms and increasing the detection accuracy in such meth-
ods are a challenging problem.
In this paper, we propose a new framework for the detec-
tion of flooding attacks. The proposed approach is intended
to detect low intensity attacks in backbone traffic. It is based
on Power Divergence (PD [4]) and Sketch data structure [6].
Sketch is used for dimensionality reduction and to derive
time series for randomly aggregated traffic, and PD mea-
sures the difference between 2 set of probability values, and
detects the deviation between these sets in normal and under
anomaly conditions. The PD is a general form of divergence
measures, where Kullback-Leibler (KL [3]), Hellinger Dis-
tance (HD [17]), Chi-square (χ2 [16]), etc. can be derived
from PD by changing its parameter (β). We emphasize in
our analysis the optimal parameter of Power Divergence.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related
work is provided in section 2. Section 3 describes briefly the
Sketch data structure. The proposed approach is explained
in section 4. In section 5, we present our experimental re-
sults. Finally, in section 6 we present the conclusion and our
future work.
2. RELATED WORK
Several approaches have been proposed for network anomaly
detection, and they are based on different techniques, such as
Haar-wavelet analysis [9], entropy based method [7], CUmu-
lative SUM (CUSUM) algorithm [15, 18], adaptive thresh-
old [2], ExponentiallyWeighted Moving Average (EWMA) [20],
Holt-Winters seasonal forecasting [13], data reduction tech-
niques with Sketch [6], SNMP MIB statistical data analy-
sis [21], Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [8], etc.
Malicious activity usually provokes an abrupt change in
the statistical values of the parameters describing the traf-
fic, such as the NetScan produced by worms outbreak, that
sends a large number of SYN from the same source IP, to
scan the network before propagation phase. In [19], the
CUSUM algorithm is used to detect SYN flooding over one
time series resulted from aggregating whole traffic in one
flow. In [15] a comparison between CUSUM and adaptive
threshold for the detection of SYN flooding is presented.
Both algorithms have been applied over one time series (whole
traffic) for scalability issues and real time processing. Low
intensity attacks get smoothed with the normal variations
of background traffic in backbone network and pass unde-
tected, i.e. flooding attack with intensity 106 packets/s does
not produce a noticeable deviation when the total number
of normal packets is greater than 109. Furthermore, these
methods use static threshold for detecting anomalies, which
is not adequate with traffic variations, and may induce false
alarm and miss detection. In this paper, we want to over-
come these problems (aggregation in one time series and
static threshold) through the use of Sketch and dynamic
threshold.
The Principal Component Analysis (PCA [8]) have been
proposed and used for dimensionality reduction and anomaly
detection. PCA detects anomalies using the evaluation of
flows correlations over single link, instead of single time se-
ries of whole traffic from many links. However, PCA is very
sensitive to the number of dominant PCs. Authors in [5]
proved that PCA is unable to detect high intensity attacks
without the good configuration. In [12], the authors showed
that methods for tuning PCA are not adequate and starting
with a new data set, adjusting parameters is unexpectedly
difficult.
Sketch data structure uses the random aggregation for
more grained detection than aggregating whole traffic in one
time series. It has been used to summarize monitored traffic
in a fixed memory, and to provide scalable input for time
series analysis. We will exploit the Sketch data structure to
derive probability distributions.
Authors in [1] experiment the histogram-based detector in
order to detect the anomaly behaviors and changes in traffic
distributions. They apply Kullback-Leibler divergence be-
tween the current and previous measurement distributions.
Authors in [17] apply Hellinger Distance (HD) on Sketch
data structure, in order to detect divergence between cur-
rent and previous distributions of the number of SIP IN-
VITE request. In fact, HD must be near zero when prob-
ability distributions are similar, and it increases up to one
whenever the distributions diverges (e.g. under Invite flood-
ing attacks). In addition, they used the dynamic threshold
proposed in [14] during their experimental analysis.
In this paper, we provide a more grained analysis then
aggregating the whole traffic in one time series. We develop
a general framework that increases the detection accuracy
and reduces the false alarm by integrating the Power Diver-
gence over Sketch technique. We show also that KL, HD &
χ2 measures used in [1, 17] are special cases of our frame-
work. We will show how PD outperforms these measures by
changing its parameter (β).
3. K-ARY SKETCH
Sketch generates fixed-number of time series [6] regard-
less the number of exiting flows. It allows more grained
analysis than aggregating whole traffic in one flow. It is
based on random aggregation of traffic in d different hash ta-
bles. Let X = x1, x2, . . . , xn denotes the set of input stream,
where each item xi = (κi, νi) is identified by a key κi ∈ U ,
drawn from a fixed universe of items U . νi ∈ R is the value
associated with each key. In our model, we use κi = DIP
and νi = 1 for each received SYN by the associated Desti-
nation IP (DIP).
A Sketch S is a 2D array of d×w cell (as shown in Fig. 1),
contains d hash arrays. The arrival of a flow with key κi in-
crements its associated counter in the jth hash table by νi
(Sj,hj(κi)+ = νi). The update procedure is realized by d
different hash functions, chosen from the set of 2-universal
hash functions hj(κi) = {((ajκi + bj) mod PU ) mod w}, to
uniformly distribute κi over hash tables and to reduce col-
lisions. The parameter PU is a prime number larger than
the maximum number in the universe. aj and bj are ran-
dom integers smaller than PU , with aj 6= 0. Using d hash
functions, the probability that two keys are aggregated in
the same bucket over the d hash tables is (1/w)d.
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Figure 1: Sketch data structure
Sketch randomly aggregates multiple IP addresses in the
same bucket, if the value resulted from hashing the addresses
is the same (h(DIP1) = h(DIP2) = j). The counter in each
bucket is used to derive a probability as the ratio of counter
value to the sum of whole counters in one hash table :
pij =
S [i] [j]
w∑
j=1
S [i] [j]
(1)
4. PROPOSED APPROACH
The approach used in this paper to detect flooding attacks
is based on Power Divergence. In fact, the idea is to estimate
the subjective prior distribution of the traffic and to use it
as a baseline probability. Let Pi = [pi,1, ..., pi,w] denotes
the probability distribution derived from the ith hash table,
in the discrete time interval T . In presence of attacks, the
probability distribution changes. One can use this change
to detect anomalies. However, with the normal traffic vari-
ations, this probability distribution changes also even in the
absence of anomaly. This is called false alarms. The objec-
tive then is to find a method that detects the attacks and
remove the false alarms.
This motivates the need for a quantitative measure of in-
formation or more generally a decision theoretic measure of
divergence between the basic probability Pi and some other
distribution Qi. Power Divergences are generalizations of
this decision measure and are associated with strictly con-
vex functions. The Power Divergence has been first defined
in [4] and equivalent variants (up to a scale factor β) of this
divergence are discussed in [11]. The divergence measure
is therefore the decision measure that generalizes KL, HD
and χ2 divergence to a broad class of divergence of order
β. In fact, the PD is a measure of distance between two
probability set of order β given as follows:
PDi = PD(Pi||Qi) =
w∑
j=1
pij(pij/qij)
β−1 − 1
β(β − 1)
(2)
where Pi is the probability distribution in the current time
interval, and Qi is the probability distribution in previous
interval. PDi = 0 iff Pi and Qi are identical (pij = qij),
and PDi > 0 when Pi 6= Qi. PDi must be near zero under
normal traffic, with a large deviation (one spike) when dis-
tributions change occurs. d measures (PD1, PD2, . . . , PDd)
are resulted from the d hash tables in Eq. 2. Anomaly in-
duces spike in PDi, and when more than L values of PDi
exceed a dynamic threshold, an alarm is raised.
The Power Divergence presents some interesting special
cases when changing its parameter β, as shown in table 1.
Obviously, Power Divergence outperforms then KL, χ2 and
HD measures as they are special cases. In fact, by changing
the values of β, one can optimize the detection of attacks
compared to the KL, χ2 and HD measures. By experiments,
we will show numerically that for different values of β, the
detection efficiency changes. The optimal value of β can
then be obtained through our experiments.
β Divergence measure
-1 1
2
× χ2(Qi||Pi)
0 KL(Qi||Pi)
0.5 4×HD(Pi||Qi)
1 KL(Pi||Qi)
2 1
2
× χ2(Pi||Qi)
Table 1: Special cases of Power Divergence
Pi and Qi in Eq. 1 are derived from the i
th hash table in
Sketch data structure, in two consecutive discrete intervals.
Firstly, the shared counters of the sketch are continuously
updated from ongoing traffic during a time interval T . At
the end of each interval, the probability pi,j is calculated,
and PD is applied to detect deviations.
When L values of PDi are larger than dynamically up-
dated threshold, we raise an alarm. However, PD induces
only two spikes (at the start and at the end of attack). As we
want to continuously raise alarms for whole duration of the
attack, the prior distribution Qi will stop sliding by keeping
its value until the end of the attack. However, with the vari-
ations of normal traffic, and the similarity of DDoS attacks
with flash crowd, we suppose that flooding attacks will span
for many intervals to overload a server, in contrast to flash
crowd and normal variation. Thus reduce the false alarms.
Therefore, we will trigger an alarm only if the deviation lasts
more than η intervals.
Detection threshold
Let PDi,kT represent the time series of resulted Power Di-
vergences from different time intervals. To detect deviations
in PDi,kT , we derive a subsequent time series PDi,kT that
contains the values of PDi,kT smaller than dynamic thresh-
old, i.e. without spikes values. As the empirical rule states
that 95% of data fall within 2 standard deviations of mean,
PDi,kT contains only values that satisfy:
PDi,kT < µi,(k−1)T + 2.σi,(k−1)T (3)
Where µi,kT & σi,kT are the mean and the standard devia-
tion of PDi,kT respectively. µi,kT and σi,kT are updated dy-
namically using the EWMA (Exponentially Weighted Mov-
ing Average):
µi,kT = αµi,(k−1)T + (1− α)PDi,(k−1)T (4)
σ2i,kT = ασ
2
i,(k−1)T + (1− α)(PDi,kT − µi,kT )
2 (5)
The threshold is updated dynamically by adjusting the
value of µi,kT and σi,kT as shown in eqs. 4 & 5. PDi,kT falls
down the threshold (µi,(k−1)T + 2.σi,(k−1)T ) under normal
condition, and exceeds the dynamic threshold under flooding
attack. The decision function for alarms is given in Eq. 6.
To reduce false alarm resulted from normal traffic variations,
PDi,kT must exceed the dynamic threshold for η consecutive
intervals before raising an alarm.
d(Ai) =


1 if PDi,kT ≥ µi,(k−1)T + 2.σi,(k−1)T
and η ≥ 3
0 Otherwise
(6)
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the performance analysis results
for the Power Divergence over Sketch, for SYN flooding at-
tacks detection. Afterward, we conduct analysis to study
the impact of parameters on true positive and false alarm
ratio. Since web servers use TCP protocol, SYN flooding
is the most commonly used attack. Therefore, we focus on
presenting the experiment results for SYN flooding detec-
tion (due to space limitations), but the proposed approach
had applied for the detection of any type of flooding (with
TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc.).
We use the real internet MAWI [10] trans-Pacific traces
from 15/04/2010 12h00 to 18h15 as few hours in the life of
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Figure 2: Total number of packets
under normal condition
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Figure 3: Total number of TCP
segments under normal condition
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Figure 4: Total number of SYN
segments under normal condition
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Figure 5: Total number of packets
under DDoS attacks
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Figure 6: Total number of TCP
segments under DDoS attacks
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Figure 7: Total number of SYN
segments under DDoS attacks
the internet, to test the efficiency of these used algorithm.
We have analyzed these traces of wide area network, using
Sketch with κi = DIP , and vi = 1 for SYN request only.
The used parameters in our implementation are: w = 1024,
d = 5, η = 3, α = 0.2, L = 3. For the sake of clarity, we
present the results of Power Divergence over the first line of
Sketch.
The effect of Sketch parameters (width and depth) on the
detection accuracy had analyzed in [6]. Authors provide a
detailed analysis of the impact of the number of hash func-
tion (d) and the Sketch width (w) on the detection accuracy.
They found that Sketch provides better accuracy when in-
creasing d & w, but at the cost of increasing the required
memory and the computational complexity. A trade-off be-
tween accuracy and complexity is required, where d = 5
and w = 1024 were chosen as the lowest values to achieve
this trade-off in our experiments. Also, the time interval T
is subject to reduce the detection delay and the computa-
tional complexity. For a value of T = 1sec the computa-
tional complexity increases, and for T = 5min the detection
delay increases. Therefore, we chose T = 1min as tradeoff.
We analyze these traces using the proposed approach with
κi=SIP (Source IP) and vi = 1 for SYN segment. We find
many scanning anomalies (SSH Scan, RPC & Netbios Scan,
etc.). Afterward, we apply our approach with κi=DIP (Des-
tination IP), and we don’t find any existing SYN flooding
attacks in these raw traces. Therefore, we inject 9 real DDoS
attacks with different intensity to simulate distributed SYN
flooding attacks. These attacks are inserted each 30 minutes,
and the duration of each one is 10 minutes. The intensity
of these attacks begins with a value of 10000 and decreases
until 2000 SYN/min.
Fig. 2 and Fig. 5 show the variation of the total num-
ber of packets before and after the SYN flooding attacks.
By comparing these variations, no noticeable deviations be-
tween both figures, and inserted attacks don’t induce heavy
deviations in the time series of the total number of packets.
Indeed, Fig. 3 and Fig. 6 show the variation of the number of
TCP segments before and after the SYN flooding attacks.
We can notice that the shape of traffic variations in both
figures is similar. This can be explained by the fact that the
intensity of SYN flooding is relatively small when compared
to the intensity of the total number of TCP segments. In
such cases, the detection of these low intensity attacks is
very challenging.
Fig. 4 and Fig. 7 show the variation of SYN before and
after SYN flooding attacks. In fact, we can notice the large
variations in the total number of SYN (Fig. 4) before attacks
injection. Therefore, the aggregation of whole traffic in one
time series produces a lot of false alarms for these heavy de-
viations. On the other hand, the injected SYN flooding at-
tacks produce small variations in the number of SYN (lower
than existing normal variations) as shown in Fig. 7. We may
not notice the difference between Fig. 4 & Fig. 7 without a
deep inspection, given the low intensity of flooding attacks
and the large variations in the number of SYN.
We conducted many experiments by varying the values of
β in order to find the optimal one. We present the variation
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Figure 8: PD for β = 0.5
(Hellinger Distance)
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Figure 9: PD for β = 1 (Kullback-
Leibler)
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Figure 10: PD for β = 1.5 (Un-
known Divergence)
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Figure 11: PD for β = 2 (χ2 diver-
gence)
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Figure 12: PD for β = 2.5 (Un-
known Divergence)
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Figure 13: Receiver Operating
Characteristic (variation of β)
of Power Divergence with the dynamic threshold (given in
Eq. 3) on the traffic with variable intensity attacks. Fig. 8
shows the variation of PD with β = 0.5 (PD = 4 × HD),
Fig. 9 with β = 1 (PD = KL), Fig. 10 with β = 1.5,
Fig. 11 with β = 2 (PD = 1/2× χ2), and Fig. 12 with β =
2.5. Whenever the Power Divergence exceeds the dynamic
threshold, an alarm is raised. It is important to note the
scale difference between these figures, where the intensity of
raised pikes increases when increasing the value of β. We
don’t use the same scale for the sake of clarity.
To evaluate the performance of Power Divergence with dif-
ferent values of β, we investigate the detection rate and the
false alarm rate. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
is used for accuracy analysis when varying the value of the
threshold. ROC curve shows the variation of the true posi-
tive (Eq. 7) in term of false alarm rate (Eq. 8):
DR =
TP
TP + FN
× 100 (7)
Where TP is the number of true positive alerts, and FN is
the number of false negative. The false alarm rate is defined
as the ratio of false alarms to the number of raised alarms:
FAR =
FP
TP + FP
× 100 (8)
In Fig. 13, we present the ROC curve for different values
of β. We found through experiments that for β = 0.5 (PD
is proportional to HD), PD achieves a DR=100% with a
FAR=30%, for β = 1 (PD is equal to KL), PD achieves a
DR=100% with a FAR=23%, for β = 1.5 & β = 2 (PD
is proportional to χ2), PD achieves a DR=100% with a
FAR=18%, and for β ≥ 2.5, PD achieves a DR=100% with
a FAR=10%. It is important to note, that we conduct many
experiments with different values of β (with a step 0.5 and
up to a value of 100). We found through experiments, with
a value of β ≥ 2.5, the intensity of PD for detected attacks
increases significantly and proportionally to the attack in-
tensity, but without any change in the ROC. Therefore, PD
with β = 2.5 outperforms existing measures and achieves
the optimal performance.
6. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we proposed a new framework based on
Sketch and Power Divergence for anomaly detection over
high speed links. The proposed approach evaluated on real
traces with DDoS SYN flooding attacks. Our experimental
results showed the capacity of PD in the detection of low
intensity attacks. We presented the results of PD with dif-
ferent values of β, as well as the associated ROC curves when
varying the threshold. We proved through experiments that
PD outperforms existing measures (HD, KL & χ2) when in-
creasing the value of (β). We found that for β = 2.5, PD
achieves the optimal performance.
In our future work, we will focus on defense mechanisms,
in order to trigger automatic reaction against ongoing at-
tacks. We also intend to provide a method for reducing the
amount of monitored data on high speed networks, and to
analyze the impact of sampling on the precision of PD di-
vergence measure.
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